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LADY JUSTICE CANNOT HEAR YOUR PRAYERS
Deborah Ogali*
The Islamic finance industry continues to grow quickly as the appetite for
everything, from Sharia-compliant home mortgages and car loans to
sophisticated financial products, increases. This growth has triggered an
interest in sukuk, bond-like financial instruments.
And while the
international market for sukuk has long been dominated by foreign issuers
and English law, the attraction of a niche market compatible with U.S.
federal and international securities laws may propel increased participation
by U.S. issuers and investors who wish to transact under U.S. federal and
state laws.
As with all Islamic financial products, sukuk transactions inherently pose
a Sharia compliance risk. Thus far, religious compliance has not posed a
significant barrier to the international market given that most sukuk
transactions are governed by secular laws that incorporate Sharia law or
laws that are not averse to interpreting religious law. U.S. jurisprudence,
however, has strongly avoided religious questions that would require courts
to interpret religious doctrines. While the application of the religiousquestion doctrine helps maintain the separation of church and state, it can
withhold secular judicial remedies from parties to a commercial agreement
that incorporates religious tenets, such as a sukuk transaction.
Drawing upon the example of Dana Gas PJSC, a company that sued to
have its own sukuk certificates declared invalid and related payment
obligations declared unenforceable due to the transaction’s alleged
noncompliance with Sharia law, this Note explores the Establishment Clause
obstacles to adjudication of a similar claim under New York law. Ultimately,
this Note concludes that the Establishment Clause bars adjudication of the
merits of such a dispute and proposes the adoption of legislation, at the state
and federal level, that would permit secular courts to “certify” religious
questions to party-selected religious tribunals. Pending passage of such
litigation, commercial parties are encouraged to utilize alternative dispute
resolution.

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. & B.A., 2014, Southern
Methodist University. I would like to thank Professor Richard Squire, Jon Hermann, and the
editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their guidance and assistance. I would also
like to thank my family, friends, and T.C. for their encouragement and support.
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INTRODUCTION
Implicit in every contract is the availability of a judicial remedy.1 The
presumed authority of courts to intervene in a contract dispute gives teeth to
the threat of consequences for a breach of contract. Otherwise, parties would
only be incentivized to perform their contractual obligations by reputational
and reputation-related economic considerations.2 A world in which a harmed
party cannot sue a breaching party to recover damages3 runs counter to the
history of common-law breach of contract, wherein a valid agreement
demands performance or damages.4 For parties whose contract dispute
touches on religious matters, however, the possibility that a breach will not
1. The concept of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including arbitration or
mediation, is premised on the notion that such disputes could otherwise be adjudicated in a
court. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism:
Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (2011) (recognizing
that an arbitration agreement “demonstrate[s] [the parties’] consent to exit the realm of
standard legal adjudication”).
2. See Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1679, 1685 & n.18 (2008) (noting that certain business communities rely on
reputation, not damages, to enforce contracts).
3. This premise assumes the claim is not otherwise barred by statutes of limitations, ADR
agreements, or for lack of standing.
4. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 919–20 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Virtually every contract operates, not as a guarantee of particular future conduct,
but as an assumption of liability in the event of nonperformance . . . .”).

2018]

LADY JUSTICE CANNOT HEAR YOUR PRAYERS

1295

be remedied is an ever-present reality.5 As a matter of faith, the Bible may
correctly claim that the “effective, fervent prayer of a righteous man avails
much.”6 As a matter of law, a plaintiff with a religious claim may only pray
for divine justice because a court will likely not hear the case.
This legal conundrum is not the byproduct of anti-religion bias, but of
courts’ strict adherence to the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.7 By
denying courts the authority to adjudicate religious disputes, states seemingly
abide by the Founding Fathers’ vision of a nation free of religious tyranny.8
What is less clear, however, is how the Founding Fathers would have reacted
to the fact that this free-religion paradise slams shut the doors of secular
justice for those whose deeply held religious beliefs permeate every facet of
their lives, including their contracts. When an agreement incorporates
religious obligations, the parties risk that, no matter the breach or the wrong,
the Establishment Clause will bar a court from deciding the merits of the
dispute.9
When a dispute arises under a commercial agreement that was drafted to
accord with religious beliefs, the judicial remedies available are limited.10
Courts in general, and New York courts in particular, have an interest in both
resolving commercial disputes11 and promoting the free exercise of
religion.12 These interests conflict when a commercial dispute is also a
religious dispute. Considering courts’ limited authority to resolve religious
disputes, this Note examines the legal obstacles that parties face in
adjudicating religious disputes arising from commercial agreements
governed by secular law, specifically in the context of the quickly growing
Islamic finance industry. This Note focuses on the adjudication of disputes
in which a party to a commercial financial agreement governed by New York
law seeks excuse from its obligations due to the agreement’s noncompliance
5. See Shai Silverman, Before the Godly: Religious Arbitration and the U.S. Legal
System, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 719, 720, 722 (2017) (noting that U.S. courts cannot decide matters
of religious law).
6. James 5:16 (New King James).
7. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been incorporated against the states. Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
8. Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”: Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L.
REV. 443, 473 (2006) (noting that the Founders were concerned with avoiding religious
tyranny when enacting the First Amendment).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. Generally, a court will either find a religious dispute nonjusticiable or it will minimize
the religious nature of the dispute to permit adjudication. See infra Part II for a discussion of
the Establishment Clause and neutral principles of law, and see also Michael A. Helfand,
Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 157, 159–60 (2011), which outlines the choices courts face when adjudicating
religious disputes.
11. See Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of
Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 117–
18 (2005); see also infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
12. See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465–66
(N.Y. 2006).
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with religious requirements. Although this Note presents resolutions
currently available under New York law, it ultimately proposes a legislative
remedy that would permit a court to “certify” religious questions to a
religious tribunal and retain jurisdiction over the secular aspects of a
commercial dispute.13
Part I introduces investment financing, Sharia law, and Islamic finance. It
continues with an overview of Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd.,14
which involved related cases in the United Kingdom, British Virgin Islands,
and United Arab Emirates15 and presents significant questions for U.S.
entities involved in the Islamic finance industry. This litigation forms the
basis for the hypothetical litigation this Note addresses. Part II examines the
implications of the Establishment Clause in secular adjudication of religious
disputes, including likely outcomes for parties seeking judicial recourse for
religious commercial disputes. Specifically, this Part analyzes likely
outcomes under New York law for a party seeking equitable rescission based
on mutual mistake of fact and concludes that the Establishment Clause
definitively bars the resolution of disputes in which a party seeks rescission
due to an agreement’s noncompliance with religious obligations that were
intended to form the basis of the agreement. Part III presents alternatives
currently available under New York law that skirt the Establishment Clause
and provide a forum for parties to resolve their disputes. Ultimately, this
Note contends that alternative dispute resolution (ADR), while satisfactory,
is not an ideal solution for parties whose disputes are both religious and
commercial. Instead, it proposes a legislative remedy that would permit
secular courts to certify religious questions to a religious tribunal of the
parties’ choosing. In so doing, a secular court would retain authority to hear
the dispute while avoiding excessive religious entanglement that would
violate the Establishment Clause.16 Nevertheless, in acknowledging
potential barriers to timely enactments of legislation permitting religious
certification,17 this Note concludes that parties who choose to incorporate
religious beliefs into commercial agreements should also include ADR
provisions in those agreements. ADR provisions help ensure that religious
parties can contract according to their beliefs while maintaining an avenue
for legal recourse and resolution of the merits of their dispute—an outcome
presently unavailable in secular judicial courts.18

13. See infra Part III.
14. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928.
15. Id. at [25]–[27].
16. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of excessive entanglement under the Establishment
Clause.
17. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
18. Although ADR provisions are generally upheld, a court may find an ADR provision
unenforceable. See Judith Resnick, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2839 n.165,
2886 & n.397 (2015) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that an arbitration
provision was inadequate, inaccessible, or ineffective, but state courts occasionally strike
arbitration provisions on grounds of unconscionability or inadequate vindication). For parties

2018]

LADY JUSTICE CANNOT HEAR YOUR PRAYERS

1297

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKING
It is important to understand the terminology and elementary investment
principles that appear throughout this Note. Part I.A begins with a basic
introduction to Western19 securities, bond offerings, and investment
financing. Part I.B introduces general principles of Sharia law pertaining to
Islamic contracts. Part I.C explains the Islamic finance industry, including
its development and standards, with a focus on tradeable Islamic financial
instruments. Part I.D briefly reviews the Dana Gas dispute, and Part I.E
highlights the implications of the Dana Gas dispute for American issuers and
investors.
A. Western Investment Financing
Western investments often involve the sale and purchase of securities.20
A “security” is generally defined as a tradeable financial instrument with
monetary value, but the term can also refer to any contract or arrangement
that involves a monetary investment in a common enterprise that is expected
to yield profits solely from a third party’s efforts.21 Issuers offer securities
to raise capital22 and generally characterize the security as equity or debt.23
The most common equity and debt instruments are stocks and bonds,
respectively. As an equity instrument, a share of stock represents an
ownership interest in an issuer’s company,24 whereas a bond represents a
debt obligation payable by the issuer to the bondholder.25 Moreover, a
security can be traded on a public exchange or sold to a restricted group of
private investors.26

to a religious dispute, striking an ADR provision would leave the parties without an
enforceable avenue of resolution.
19. “Western” will refer to American and English systems, as distinguished from their
Islamic counterparts.
20. This Note does not address alternative investments, which generally refer to
investments that fall outside stocks and bonds. H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck, Alternative
Investments: An Overview, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, PERFORMANCE,
BENCHMARKS, AND STRATEGIES 3, 3 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck eds., 2013).
21. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99, 301 (1946); ALAN N.
RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW 246, 248 n.28 (2d ed. 2014).
A security can include, but is not limited to, a note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
security-based swap, bond, or debenture. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012); W. J. Howey, 328
U.S. at 297 n.3.
22. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 46–47. The issuer is the entity that creates the
security. Id.
23. Id. Securities may also include hybrid financial instruments, with equity, debt, or
derivative instrument features, but a detailed overview of financial instruments is beyond the
scope of this Note. For more, see generally JASON A. PEDERSEN, THE WALL STREET PRIMER:
THE PLAYERS, DEALS, AND MECHANICS OF THE U.S. SECURITIES MARKET (2009), and
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21.
24. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 49. In addition to an ownership interest in the
asset, the stockholder may receive dividend payments from the profits generated by the asset.
Id.
25. Id. at 128.
26. Id. at 144–45.
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While a stock issuer can only be a company, a bond issuer may be a
company or a sovereign governmental entity.27 In addition to widening
access to capital-raising opportunities, a bond offering allows an issuer to
borrow capital in a manner that is generally less restrictive and less expensive
than a bank loan.28 Issuers of bonds have greater flexibility to operate as they
choose because they are not subject to the restrictive covenants that usually
accompany bank loans.29 Bond offerings do not dilute company ownership
or give bondholders voting rights that enable them to control the issuer.30
Bondholders are creditors of the issuer, and in the event that the issuer
becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the bondholders may have a priority claim
on the issuer’s assets.31
Although investors can enter the financial market individually, many seek
collective investments that provide access to a broader range of
opportunities, better management expertise, and lower costs. For example,
many investors will use a pooled investment vehicle, such as an investment
fund.32 In an investment fund, investors do not make the day-to-day
investment decisions, but they entrust those decisions to an investment
manager.33 Investors select a fund based on targeted returns, risk,
management expertise, and management fees.34 A private equity fund is
often structured as a limited partnership (LP), in which the investors are the
limited partners.35 To join an LP, an investor must execute a subscription

27. Id. at 46.
28. William W. Bratton, Bond and Loan Covenants, Theory and Practice, 11 CAP.
MARKETS L.J. 461, 478–80 (2016). A bond’s cost depends on factors such as coupon rate,
maturity date, and redemption options. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 128. A coupon rate
is the contractual interest rate on the bond. Coupon, A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING
(6th ed. 2018). The coupon rate may be fixed or variable. A fixed rate is a set interest rate
that does not change regardless of interest rate fluctuations in the market. Fixed Rate, A
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018). A variable rate, also known as a
floating rate, is based on a market-index rate, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR). Floating Interest Rate, A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018).
LIBOR is the interest rate at which banks lend money to each other for short-term loans in the
London intermarket. London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE
AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018). The maturity date is the date on which the principal and interest
must be repaid in full to the bondholder. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 128. Redemption
options may allow an issuer to repay the principal before the maturity date or allow a
bondholder to redeem the principal before the maturity date. Id. at 128–29. An issuer’s credit
rating is determined by independent agencies, including Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and
Fitch, based on the issuer’s financial position. Id. at 129.
29. Bratton, supra note 28, at 478–80.
30. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 128.
31. Id. at 128.
32. See Harry Cendrowski & Adam A. Wadecki, Introduction to Private Equity, in
PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 3, 5 (Harry Cendrowski et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2012). Although there are several types of investment funds, this Note focuses on
the private equity fund structure. Private equity investments are considered a type of
alternative investment, as contrasted with traditional investments such as stocks and bonds,
and generally are not traded on a public exchange. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 23.
35. Id. at 5.
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agreement that specifies the investor’s contribution to the fund.36 The LP, in
turn, executes an investment management agreement with an entity with
investing expertise.37 The investment manager controls the fund’s
investments, subject to any restrictions specified in the governing documents,
including assets acquired, duration of holdings, and disposition of holdings.38
The fund generally has a limited lifecycle,39 during which the investment
manager invests the fund’s capital for a defined period of time to generate
the targeted financial returns for the fund and its investors.40 At the end of
the fund’s lifecycle, the investment manager disposes of the fund’s assets,
returns the investors’ investment, and provides the investors with fees, profit
splits, and guaranteed returns, if any.41
B. Sharia Law Limitations on Contract Formation
Sharia42 is the divine law of Islam and covers topics ranging from religious

practices to contracts. Islamic law is derived from four sources: the Qur’an,
Sunna, ijma‘, and qiyas.43 The Qur’an and Sunna are revered as sources of
divine revelation, while ijma‘ reflects community consensus, and qiyas
reflects logical reasoning, most commonly in the form of reasoning by
analogy.44 A fatwa is a formal Islamic legal opinion and is generally issued
when a novel legal question arises.45 Fatwas are routinely issued by Sharia

36. See TIMOTHY SPANGLER, THE LAW OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS 89 (3d ed. 2018).
37. Id.
38. See Cendrowski & Wadecki, supra note 32, at 12. Private equity funds may invest in
private companies or buy out public companies. See id. at 4. The fund may hold and improve
an asset with the goal of selling the asset later at a significant profit, such as a low-performing
company whose business operations are optimized before being sold at a profit. Id. at 21–22.
39. Id. at 12. The fund’s lifecycle is usually defined in the fund’s limited partnership
agreement. Id.
40. See id. at 8, 12.
41. Id. at 10.
42. There are two distinct branches within Islam—Sunni and Shi‘a—which differ, largely,
on the line of succession after the Prophet Muhammad. To the extent there are any doctrinal
or practical differences, this Note will enunciate the Sunni perspective because the Sunni
branch dominates the Islamic finance industry. David M. Eisenberg, Sources and Principles
of Islamic Law, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 15, 30–31 (Craig R. Nethercott &
David M. Eisenberg eds., 2012). Islamic jurisprudence comprises human interpretations of
the divine law and includes substantive principles. The sources used to elaborate on the
substantive principles are known as fiqh. Cynthia Shawamreh, The Legal Framework of
Islamic Finance, in CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC FINANCE: INNOVATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND
BEST PRACTICES 39, 39 (Karen Hunt-Ahmed ed., 2013). Sharia is considered unlimited and,
therefore, unknowable. Id.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 17–18.
44. Id.; Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 40–41. The Qur’an, which Muslims believe was
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by Allah directly, was standardized during the third Sunni
caliph and is generally accepted in its current standardized form. Shawamreh, supra note 42,
at 40. The Sunna, compiled during the ninth century, is a collection of the recounted actions
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, known collectively as hadith. Eisenberg, supra note
42, at 22–23. Islamic scholars agree on the text of the Qur’an and Sunna. Shawamreh, supra
note 42, at 41.
45. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 29.
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supervisory boards of Islamic financial institutions regarding general
practices or the Sharia compliance of specific products or transactions.46
Islam highly values the concept of personal ownership of property.47 As
such, Islamic contracting principles aim to reduce or eliminate exploitative
or risky behaviors that would unduly deprive one of property.48 When
entering an Islamic contract, there are a few general governing principles.
One of the most important principles is the prohibition of riba, unjustified
increase.49 While the full boundaries of riba are still disputed in Islamic
scholarship,50 there is general consensus that it prohibits any payment or
receipt of interest.51 Since Islam does not recognize the time value of money,
money alone cannot increase or decrease in value without being linked to an
asset.52 Next, Islamic law prohibits transactions involving excessive gharar,
or uncertainty.53 Gharar is implicated in any transaction where the value of
the subject matter cannot be determined at the time the agreement is
executed, such as in a purchase agreement for grain from a specific field that
has not yet been harvested.54 Most transactions involve a degree of gharar,55
but excessive gharar voids a contract.56 Lastly, the subject matter of Islamic
contracts cannot involve haram, or forbidden, activities.57
C. Primer on Islamic Finance
In keeping with Islamic contracting concerns about exploitation and
excessive gharar, Islamic finance is based on a risk-sharing model.58 This
model directly contradicts the Western interest rate–based system that
guarantees a return for the lender.59 Because the traditional model demands
repayment even if the borrower is unable to pay, Islam views interest rate–
based systems as unjust and exploitative.60 Instead, Islamic finance uses a
46. Id. at 30.
47. See SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, LAND, LAW AND ISLAM: PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 11–13 (2006).
48. See id. at 11.
49. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 47.
50. This Note does not focus on the intricacies of the scholarly debates regarding riba and
does not delve into the distinctions in types of riba or competing interpretations.
51. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 41; Atif Hanif & Julian Johansen, Sukuk, in ISLAMIC
FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 254, 259. This principle prohibits the use of
credit cards with interest rates or penalty rates for late payments of debt. ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SHARI’AH STANDARDS 80, 95
(2015) [hereinafter AAOIFI].
52. See SAIT & LIM, supra note 47, at 12.
53. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 45.
54. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 50. Advance sales of crops are permissible where the
quantity and quality are predetermined. Id.
55. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 45.
56. Id. at 47–48.
57. See AAOIFI, supra note 51, at 642 (noting that Sharia-impermissible activities include
those relating to alcohol, drugs, gambling, pork, prostitution, nightclubs, and statues); see also
Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 45.
58. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 45.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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system of profit and loss sharing, in which parties are less likely to be
exploited by one another because the risk of nonpayment is spread among all
parties.61 As with individual contracts, any financed business activity must
also comport with Islamic standards.62
Just as stocks and bonds may be the most recognizable Western financial
instruments, the most well-known Islamic financial instrument is the sakk.63
In 1988, the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference held that “any combinations of assets . . . can be represented in
the form of written financial instruments” and thus opened the door for the
modern sukuk market.64 Presently, the Sharia Board of the Accounting and
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) defines
sukuk as “certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in
ownership of tangible assets.”65 AAOIFI, formed in 1991, promulgates
Sharia standards for Islamic financial transactions.66 In its relatively short
history, AAOIFI has established itself as an authority on standards of Sharia
compliance for financial transactions.67
In 2007, the chairman of AAOIFI’s Sharia Board, Sheikh Muhammad
Taqi Usmani, published a paper criticizing sukuk structures that he believed
created impermissible debt obligations despite facial compliance with
Islamic principles.68 Usmani’s paper led to the issuance of revised AAOIFI
Sharia standards in 2008 and an industry-wide shakeup in the structuring of
Islamic financial transactions.69
Although sukuk are commonly referred to as Islamic bonds, they provide
the owner with an equity interest.70 Like an issuer offering bonds, an
originator raising capital forms an incorporated special-purpose vehicle
(SPV) that issues the sukuk certificates.71 As in a private equity fund,
investors subscribe and purchase the sukuk certificates.72 The cash from the
subscription is used by the SPV to purchase the target assets or finance the
business activity.73 As equity instruments, the certificates represent an
ownership interest in the underlying assets.74 Like a bond’s coupon
payments, sukuk generate periodic payments to investors, which constitute

61. Id.
62. Id. Therefore, Islamic financial transactions cannot relate to trade in forbidden
products, such as pork, alcohol, drugs, or pornography.
63. Sakk is an Arabic word that translates to “deed” or “instrument.” Hanif & Johansen,
supra note 51, at 255. The plural form of sakk is sukuk. Id. Historically, sakk referred to any
document that represented a financial liability. Id. at 255.
64. Id. at 256.
65. AAOIFI, supra note 51, at 468.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 257.
69. Id. at 256; see infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
70. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 259.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 258–59; Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 53.
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either rent or installment sale payments,75 and return the investors’ capital
with a profit when available.76 While the periodic payments are calculated
using a profit rate rather than an interest rate, like a bond’s coupon rate, the
profit rate is often benchmarked against a market index, such as LIBOR.77
Unlike a bond, investors are not guaranteed recovery of their capital, much
less a profit.78 If the asset underperforms and generates a loss, all parties,
including the investors, bear the loss.79 This important feature satisfies the
risk-sharing model of Islamic finance.
The Islamic finance industry generally employs eight common sukuk
structures based on investment goals.80 Of these, sukuk al-wakala and almudaraba resemble the traditional investment fund arrangement, in which
the fund manager manages assets or a portfolio of assets.81 Sukuk almudaraba best replicates a limited partnership agreement.82 The rabb almal, the financier, contributes capital but does not participate in the business
activities of the venture, while the mudarib, the sponsor, manages the
business activities but does not contribute capital.83 Thus, the rabb al-mal
and mudarib mirror the roles of limited partners and investment managers.84
In the event of asset underperformance, the rabb al-mal bears the financial
loss, while the mudarib loses the value of his labor.85 Sukuk al-musharaka
resembles a joint venture in which all parties contribute funds and may
actively participate in the business.86 Profits and losses are distributed
according to a predetermined ratio,87 similar to pro rata distributions in
Western investment funds.

75. The source of the funding of the periodic payments—whether rent or installment sale
payments—will depend on the structure of the sukuk.
76. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 53.
77. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 256. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying
text for a discussion of traditional bond offerings.
78. See AAOIFI, supra note 51, at 477.
79. See id.
80. See Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 258. See generally ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, for detailed discussions of the eight common sukuk structures:
(1) al-ijara, (2) al-musharaka, (3) al-istithmar, (4) al-manafa’a, (5) al-istisna‘, (6) al-wakala,
(7) al-mudaraba, al-manafa’a, and (8) al-murabaha.
81. See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional
investment funds. A mudaraba agreement is akin to an investment management agreement.
Contrast this with sukuk al-murabaha, which most resemble conventional loan financing and
are generally nontradeable on the secondary market because they are considered debt
receivables. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52. Sukuk al-murabaha structures are generally
disfavored in the Islamic market, as some consider the use of al-murabaha to be a facial
workaround of the principles of Islamic finance. Id.; see also Craig R. Nethercott, Murabaha
and Tawarruq, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 192, 200–01.
82. Julian Johansen & Atif Hanif, Musharaka and Mudaraba, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 174, 184–85; Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52.
83. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52.
84. See supra notes 33–41 for a description of a typical private equity investment fund
structure.
85. Johansen & Hanif, supra note 82, at 185.
86. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52.
87. Id.
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Sheikh Usmani’s 2007 fatwa challenged the Sharia compliance of 80
percent of the then-issued sukuk and particularly implicated al-mudaraba and
al-musharaka structures.88 Usmani stated that the structures impermissibly
guaranteed repayment on maturity and, instead, should behave as equity
instruments for appropriate profit and loss sharing.89 Like bond issuers,
sukuk originators or sponsors tend to be Islamic financial institutions but can
include individual companies or sovereign governmental entities.90 While
sukuk issuances have been slow to gain popularity in the United States, there
have been several issuances by American entities engaged in international
markets.91
To have a sukuk issuance declared Sharia compliant, the parties must first
obtain a fatwa from a board of Islamic scholars, who confirm the instruments
are Sharia compliant.92 These scholars base their decision on Islamic
jurisprudence and consensus with one another.93 There are no regulations or
authoritative canonical laws that set forth exact parameters for compliance.94
The originator may retain these scholars in its normal course of business or
for the specific purpose of evaluating the transaction.95 Beyond the lack of
standardized contemporary Islamic financial practices, different schools of
Islamic scholarship dominate in different geographic areas, which means that
compliance determinations are often regional.96
D. Case Study: Dana Gas
In 2017, Dana Gas PJSC, an Emirati natural gas company,97 became
embroiled in litigation that threatened to rock the Islamic finance industry.
88. Rahail Ali, Islamic Finance and Documentation, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 91, 106 (Rahail Ali ed., 2d ed. 2014); Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 256; Matthew
Martin et al., Dana Gas Is Said to Miss Payment on $700 Million Sukuk Today, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 31, 2017, 7:29 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/dana-gasis-said-to-miss-payment-on-700-million-sukuk-tomorrow [https://perma.cc/WK5U-Q5TG].
89. See Martin et al., supra note 88.
90. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 256–57 (noting that a Malaysian plantation
company issued the first international sukuk, followed by sovereign issuances by Malaysia,
Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, and Dubai).
91. Id. at 267 (noting sukuk issuance and default by East Cameron Partners, an American
oil and gas company); UPDATE 1—Goldman Sachs Gets Strong Demand for Landmark
Sukuk Issue, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2014, 1:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/goldmansukuk-launch/update-1-goldman-sachs-gets-strong-demand-for-landmark-sukuk-issue-idUS
L6N0RH2RH20140916 [https://perma.cc/BJ6R-BUGF] (announcing sukuk issuance by
Goldman Sachs, an American bank); UPDATE 1—US’ GE Capital Raises $500 Mln in Debut
Islamic Bond, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2009, 9:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/gecapitalbonds/update-1-us-ge-capital-raises-500-mln-in-debut-islamic-bond-idUSLJ417751200
91119 [https://perma.cc/ZAP8-2NCD] (announcing General Electric’s sukuk issuance as the
first sukuk issuance by a large U.S. conglomerate).
92. Ali, supra note 88, at 26.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 26–27.
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 27 (noting that the Sha’afi school dominates in Malaysia but the Hanbali school
dominates in Saudi Arabia and several Gulf Cooperation Council countries).
97. Overview,
DANA
GAS,
http://www.danagas.com/en-us/about/overview
[https://perma.cc/PMZ2-R7WF] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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Dana Gas issued 1 billion U.S. dollars’ worth of sukuk certificates, structured
as an al-mudaraba arrangement.98 The certificates originally bore an
October 2012 maturity date99 but were restructured to extend the maturity
date to October 31, 2017.100 In early 2017, the company faced liquidity
problems due to decreased global gas prices and delayed payments from its
debtors and subsequently announced it wanted to restructure the certificates
again.101 At the time, approximately $700 million of the sukuk certificates
were outstanding.102
In June 2017, the company shocked the industry by announcing that its
religious advisors concluded that the outstanding sukuk certificates were not
compliant with Sharia law.103 To bring the certificates into compliance,
Dana Gas proposed an exchange of the outstanding certificates for Shariacompliant certificates that further extended the maturity date and reduced the
profit rate payable.104 Additionally, Dana Gas announced that it would not
pay the remaining periodic distributions due under the purchase undertaking
agreement because of the purported noncompliance with religious law.105
Doubling down on its assertion, Dana Gas sought and obtained injunctions
in Emirati, British Virgin Islander, and U.K. courts to prevent any action
from being taken against the certificates, including the triggering of default
events when Dana Gas failed to make its periodic payments.106 On October
31, 2017, Dana Gas did not redeem its matured sukuk certificates, but the
injunctions prevented investors from declaring a default event.107 The Dana
Gas purchase undertaking agreement, which contains the payment obligation
provisions, was governed by English law, while the assets backing the
transaction and the underlying mudaraba agreement were subject to Emirati
law, which wholly incorporates Sharia law.108 The thrust of Dana Gas’s legal
98. Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [5], [10]; see
supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
99. Anthony Dipaola, Dana Gas to Start Restructuring Talks on Bond Due in October,
BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2017, 3:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0503/dana-gas-to-start-restructuring-talks-on-bond-due-in-october
[https://perma.cc/4GFSKWRW].
100. See Davide Barbuscia, UAE’s Dana Gas Leaves Maturing Sukuk Unpaid but No
Default Declared—Sources, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/danagas-sukuk/uaes-dana-gas-leaves-maturing-sukuk-unpaid-but-no-default-declared-sourcesidUSL8N1N60IT [https://perma.cc/FF5B-7BM8].
101. Andy Critchlow, Islamic Titanic, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (June 15, 2017),
https://www.breakingviews.com/considered-view/dana-gas-is-the-tip-of-islamic-bondiceberg/ [https://perma.cc/MP9Q-3648]; Dipaola, supra note 99.
102. Dipaola, supra note 99.
103. Arif Sharif, Why Everyone’s Talking About Dana Gas’s Sukuk, BLOOMBERG (June 18,
2017, 4:12 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-15/dana-gas-s-moveto-void-sukuk-stuns-analysts-who-question-motive [https://perma.cc/NJC9-5D6B].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Barbuscia, supra note 100. Under the governing documents, in the event of a default,
Dana Gas was required to purchase the underlying assets at a predetermined “Exercise Price.”
Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [15].
108. Sharif, supra note 103.
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argument was a mistaken-fact claim and an illegality defense: (1) the parties
were mistaken about the certificates’ compliance with Sharia law, and
(2) because the certificates were not compliant with Sharia law, the thenexisting obligations were illegal under Emirati law. Though Dana Gas did
not believe its lawsuits would have a significant impact on the market, the
legal questions posed by these suits may nevertheless impact the stability and
growth of the Islamic finance industry.109
E. Dana Gas’s Implications for U.S. Capital Markets
Although several American entities have issued sukuk,110 the transaction
agreements are generally governed by a foreign, secular law.111 However,
New York law has proven a highly desirable choice for domestic commercial
transactions.112 New York has a storied history as an important commercial
center with a strong body of commercial law.113 New York’s substantive
law is especially attractive for financial contracts.114 The substantive law
and New York’s establishment of a commercial division of its court system
increase New York’s attractiveness as a choice of law and forum.115 Thus,
it is possible that a dispute concerning sukuk could arise under New York
law, particularly for U.S. issuers. To date, only one sukuk issuance is
governed by American law,116 but as the market continues to expand, there
109. Barbuscia, supra note 100. The English courts ultimately held that even if the
agreements were not compliant with Sharia law, under English law, the risk of noncompliance
had been allocated to Dana Gas. Dana Gas, [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [75]–[77]. Further,
even if the payments would be illegal in the United Arab Emirates, they were not illegal in the
place of performance. Id. at [80]. Thus, Dana Gas could not avoid its payment obligations.
Dana Gas eventually reached a restructuring deal with its sukuk holders. Andrew Torchia,
UPDATE 1—UAE’s Dana Gas Agrees $700 Mln Sukuk Restructuring Deal, REUTERS (May
13, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/dana-gas-sukuk/update-1-uaes-danagas-agrees-700-mln-sukuk-restructuring-deal-idUSL5N1SK090
[https://perma.cc/676XS8PJ]; see also Press Release, Dana Gas, Dana Gas Shareholders Support US$700 Million
Consensual Sukuk Restructuring (June 21, 2018), http://www.danagas.com/en-us/mediacenter/press-releases/press-release-details?ID=291 [https://perma.cc/NU46-ZWU].
110. See supra note 91.
111. While English law is the preferred choice of law for international sukuk transactions,
Sharia-incorporating laws are often the preferred choice for domestic issuances. Hanif &
Johansen, supra note 51, at 266.
112. See supra note 111; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to
New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in PubliclyHeld Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1489 (2009) (finding that New York
was the choice of law in 46 percent of 2865 contract samples derived from Form 8-K filings).
113. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 112, at 1482.
114. Id. at 1486.
115. Id. at 1485–87. Commercial Division justices and court personnel are selected for
their expertise in business law. Id. at 1486.
116. Michigan-based University Bank issued a $2.5 million perpetual sukuk with a 5.75
percent profit rate. The underlying agreement is governed by New York law. Linklaters
Advises on the First Sukuk Issued Under United States Law, LINKLATERS (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.linklaters.com/en/about-us/news-and-deals/deals/2016/linklaters-advises-onthe-first-sukuk-issued-under-united-states-law [https://perma.cc/7Q2L-3J58]; University
Bank Issues $2.5 Million 5.75% Perpetual Note, MKT. WIRED (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/university-bank-issues-25-million-575perpetual-note-otcqb-unib-2112602.htm [https://perma.cc/2JGC-CT9Z].
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will likely be future issuances governed by U.S. state law. And although
Dana Gas ultimately lost its dispute on other grounds,117 there is a fear that
the company’s actions may inspire other sukuk issuers seeking to renege on
their payment obligations to have the underlying agreement declared
unenforceable based on religious interpretations and related industry
standards.
The existence of the Islamic financial industry is a response to a need for
Sharia-compliant financial products.118 By participating in this specialized
market, parties bargain for a financing arrangement that complies with
certain religious requirements. This compliance is important enough that
parties accept the increased cost of transacting in Islamic financial
products.119 It is not unreasonable for a party, willing to pay a higher price
for a Sharia-compliant investment, to seek to exit a transaction after learning
that the bargained-for subject matter does not exist. Had the parties desired
a financing arrangement that ignored religious norms, they could have
availed themselves of well-established Western capital markets, which often
carry tax benefits.120 Thus, it is possible that a situation like that of Dana
Gas—in which one party believes the certificates are not compliant with
religious law, but the counterparty disagrees—could arise and a party would
seek release from its obligations.
II. SECULAR VERSUS DIVINE: A COURT’S JURISDICTION
TO RESOLVE RELIGIOUS COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
The payment obligations in sukuk transactions are contained in a purchase
undertaking agreement, which generally relies on underlying agreements to
provide the requisite triggers and avenues for performance of obligations.121
Therefore, the validity of the purchase undertaking agreement depends, in
part, on the validity of the underlying transaction agreements, including any
investment management agreements.122 Where a party seeks avoidance by
virtue of the transaction’s noncompliance with Sharia law, the challenge
would likely be to the compliance of the underlying agreements rather than
the purchase undertaking agreement itself.123

117. See supra note 109.
118. Rahail Ali & Imran Mufti, The Global Sukuk Market and Legal Structuring
Considerations, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 88, at 109, 109.
119. Islamic financial products are generally not afforded the same tax benefits as
traditional capital markets products, but several jurisdictions have enacted legislation that
would level the playing field with Western securities. Ken Eglinton et al., Accounting and
Taxation Implications of Islamic Finance Products, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 42, at 77, 84.
120. Id.
121. See Ali, supra note 88, at 105–07.
122. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of sukuk transaction
structures.
123. See supra Part I.D., which describes Dana Gas’s challenge to the purchase
undertaking agreement on the ground that the underlying mudaraba agreement was not Sharia
compliant.
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A party seeking declaratory relief, either for excuse from performance or
for a statement of its right to expect performance, must avail itself of the
judicial system.124 If a court were to adjudicate a dispute arising from a
Western financing arrangement, justiciability would likely not pose a
significant barrier. For parties involved in an Islamic financing arrangement,
however, justiciability may be an insurmountable hurdle to ascertaining the
rights of the parties, particularly under New York law. The dispute centers
on whether the subject matter of the agreement for which the parties
negotiated, a Sharia-compliant financial product, exists and, if it does not
exist, whether that excuses the parties’ performance obligations under the
agreements. To determine whether a transaction’s subject matter exists, the
court must resolve the question of whether a financial product is Sharia
compliant. Thus, the crux of the dispute is a religious question. As such, a
court must determine whether the dispute is justiciable without running afoul
of the Establishment Clause.125
Part II.A examines the Establishment Clause issues that would arise if a
court sought to determine the compliance of sukuk transaction documents
with Sharia law. Part II.B examines possible outcomes if a court were to
minimize the religious question of Sharia compliance and attempt to
adjudicate the claim on neutral principles of law.
A. Establishment Clause Bars to Adjudication
Certainly, it is not unprecedented for American courts to apply foreign
laws that codify religious laws.126 Nevertheless, when adjudicating matters
governed by domestic laws, New York courts have determined that the First
Amendment prohibits a civil court from deciding religious disputes because
doing so would violate the Establishment Clause and entangle the state in a
religious dispute.127 This entanglement results from a court’s de facto
endorsement of a group with a particular religious belief.128 Determining the
124. See Janet Elaine Curry & Theodore Z. Wyman, Annotation, Further Relief Sought in
Declaratory Judgment Action, 10 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 23:65 (2018).
125. See infra notes 129–31 for a discussion of justiciability.
126. See, e.g., Saudi Basic Indus. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 31 (Del.
2005) (discussing the trial court’s review of over 1000 pages of expert deposition testimony
and nine expert reports on Islamic scholarship delineating the elements of the Saudi cause of
action); Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex. 2000) (affirming summary
judgment against the plaintiff after relying on expert testimony that the Afghani legal system
was based on Islamic law and that Islamic law does not recognize causes of action for tortious
interference).
127. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (N.Y.
2007) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 696 (1976)). The
First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition has been incorporated against the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). Therefore,
New York state courts will decide religion-related disputes in accordance with the U.S.
Constitution and relevant case law. Contra, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct.
1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that the First Amendment does not
apply to the states).
128. Congregation Yetev, 879 N.E.2d at 1284.
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prevailing party in a religious dispute requires a court to credit one party’s
religious interpretation and dismiss the other party’s interpretation as
incorrect.129 In doing so, a court impermissibly puts itself in the position of
declaring the “correct” practice of a religion.130 If, therefore, resolution of a
matter would require a court to rule on religious doctrines or practices, that
dispute is nonjusticiable even though the court may otherwise retain subject
matter jurisdiction.131 As the New York Court of Appeals noted, however,
if the court can resolve the claim based on “objective, well-established
principles of secular law,” a religious matter is justiciable.132
New York courts have long been troubled by the state and federal
constitutional implications of resolving disputes that require the
interpretation of religious doctrines.133 Courts have consistently held that it
is inappropriate for a fact finder to interpret or apply religious requirements
to decide whether religious law has been violated.134 Explaining the
rationale of the prohibition, the New York Court of Appeals stated, “[C]ivil
courts are forbidden from interfering in or determining religious disputes.
Such rulings violate the First Amendment because they simultaneously
establish one religious belief as correct . . . while interfering with the
opposing faction’s beliefs.”135 If resolution of a matter requires a
determination of religious doctrines or practices, the court will decline to hear
the dispute.136
Not all interactions between church and state are de facto violations of the
Establishment Clause.137 Rather, each instance must be evaluated for the
scope of entanglement.138 When determining whether it will violate the
129. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718–20 (admonishing the Illinois Supreme Court for
evaluating competing testimony from religious experts on internal ecclesiastical procedures).
130. See id. at 721 (finding that the Illinois Supreme Court substituted its own interpretation
of religious procedural law in place of the proper religious hierarchical authorities).
131. See Congregation Yetev, 879 N.E.2d at 1282 (holding that the court could not decide
an internal election dispute between members of the Jewish congregation because resolution
required application of the Jewish ecclesiastical principles); Drake v. Moulton Mem’l Baptist
Church of Newburgh, 940 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282–83 (App. Div. 2012) (affirming the dismissal
of the complaint on grounds that adjudication required the court to impermissibly delve into
internal issues such as church leadership, direction, doctrine, discipline, and control); cf.
Rector, Churchwardens & Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish, 146 N.E.2d
685, 687 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that the application of Episcopalian canon law did not require
the court to decide matters of doctrine).
132. Congregation Yetev, 879 N.E.2d at 1285; see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710
(noting that courts may not resolve underlying religious doctrinal disputes when adjudicating
disputes between religious parties or regarding religious property).
133. Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (N.Y. 2001) (citing New York case law
holding that courts cannot interpret religious doctrine under the federal constitution); S. S. &
B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass’n of Greater N.Y., 285 N.Y.S. 879, 890 (Sup. Ct. 1936)
(noting the prohibition of judicial interpretation of ecclesiastical laws under New York law).
134. Lightman, 761 N.E.2d at 1033.
135. First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.,
464 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1984) (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
136. See supra note 131.
137. Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 36 (2d Cir. 2006).
138. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
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Establishment Clause, a court must determine whether state action “fosters
excessive state entanglement with religion.”139 This inquiry involves
examining the benefitting institution’s character and purposes and the
resulting relationship between the government and any religious authority.140
An interaction becomes an excessive entanglement at the point where state
action has “the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”141
Resolving a dispute regarding an Islamic financial agreement’s Sharia
compliance would require a court to rule on doctrinal matters of Islam. The
Establishment Clause creates a barrier between church and state that ensures
the government does not favor one religion or denomination over another.142
Because this principle is a cornerstone of American democracy, it is clear
that a state should not be allowed to adjudicate religious doctrinal matters,
even in a commercial context. With each ruling, the courts would manifest
a preference for one interpretation within a religion over another. This
situation would be no different than if a state enacted legislation that
preferred Baptists to Lutherans or Episcopalians to Roman Catholics. If such
preferences were to become entrenched through stare decisis, the
Establishment Clause’s protection against injustice—or religious
persecution—would be moot.143
This concern is particularly heightened for Islamic disputes. Unlike the
Vatican in Roman Catholicism or denominational organizations in American
Protestantism, Islam has no central religious authority and, therefore, no
standardization in practice.144 Thus, a court would need to develop a deep
understanding of Islamic doctrine and jurisprudence to render a decision,
which would make the court’s determination wholly discretionary. The state
would be declaring what it means to commercially abide by the tenets of a
faith. Apart from declaring a state religion or criminalizing the practice of a
religion, it is difficult to imagine a state entanglement more excessive than
declaring the elements of proper religious practice.
B. The Religious-Question Loophole: Neutral Principles of Law
Although New York courts cannot resolve religious doctrinal disputes, a
court may resolve disputes that touch religion if the matter can be adjudicated

139. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 425 (2d Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added). Such entanglements may be substantive and require the state to choose
between competing religious or procedural views where the state and church are in a legal
dispute with one another. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).
140. Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
141. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
142. See Commack Self-Serv., 294 F.3d at 425.
143. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803–06 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the four purposes of the Establishment Clause: to (1) guarantee the individual
right to conscience, (2) prevent state interference in the autonomy of religious life, (3) prevent
the trivialization and degradation of religion by being too closely involved with secular
government, and (4) ensure that religion does not become the basis of political battles).
144. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
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based on neutral principles of law.145 Consider a hypothetical lawsuit in
which a sukuk issuer seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief,
alleging that industry standards reveal that the existing sukuk transaction is
not Sharia compliant and the parties’ previous understanding of the
transaction’s compliance constitutes a mutual mistake of fact warranting
rescission of the agreement. Instead of diving into the question of Sharia
compliance, a court could first decide whether the transaction’s
noncompliance, if taken as fact, would excuse performance, without deciding
the merits of the fund’s alleged noncompliance with Sharia law.146
On a motion to dismiss, the veracity of a well-pled complaint’s factual
allegations is immaterial to the court’s ruling.147 Thus, if a sukuk holder filed
a motion to dismiss, the court would not need to determine the fact of
compliance to decide the motion. On a motion to dismiss, a New York court
will liberally construe the pleading148 and “accept the facts as alleged in the
complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable
inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any
cognizable legal theory.”149 This standard, set forth in New York’s Civil
Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR) 3211, finds its federal counterpart in Rule
8(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which states that a
federal court cannot dismiss a complaint unless “it is clear that no relief could
be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations.”150
If a court eliminated the question of Sharia compliance in evaluating a
motion to dismiss and applied neutral principles of law, it would consider
whether the sukuk’s noncompliance excuses performance on a theory of
mistake of fact.151 Under New York law, a mutual mistake of fact generally
renders a contract voidable and subject to rescission, so long as the mistaken
fact is substantial and existed at the time the contract was executed.152 A
court will order relief on these grounds only in exceptional situations.153 To
prevail on this claim, a mistaken fact must be so material that it goes to the
145. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (N.Y.
2007).
146. Indeed, this is the manner in which the English courts decided the Dana Gas litigation.
147. When considering a motion to dismiss, courts will presume a complaint’s factual
allegations are true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Leon v. Martinez, 638
N.E.2d 511, 513 (N.Y. 1994).
148. Leon, 638 N.E.2d at 513 (applying New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR)
3211, which governs motions to dismiss).
149. Id. at 512–13.
150. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–14 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f).
151. A claim for mistake of fact should not be confused with a claim for mistake of law,
which likely could not be asserted. Neither New York law nor federal law recognizes Sharia
as a binding system of law. Furthermore, even if Sharia law was recognized as binding, a
mistake of law claim cannot be asserted on the basis of a subsequent change in law. Anita
Founds., Inc. v. ILGWU Nat’l Ret. Fund, 902 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 207–09 (1973)).
152. Gould v. Bd. of Educ., 616 N.E.2d 142, 146 (N.Y. 1993).
153. Simkin v. Blank, 968 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y. 2012).
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foundation of the agreement and constitutes a basic assumption of the
contract.154 In other words, it must “vitally affect the basis upon which the
parties contract”155 such that the mistake precluded a meeting of the minds
requisite to form an agreement.156 In determining the existence of a mutual
mistake of fact, a court applies an objective test.157
Given the intricacies and purpose of the Islamic finance industry, the
transaction’s compliance with Sharia law could constitute a basic assumption
of the agreement that would vitally affect a meeting of the minds. If a court
were to determine whether a mutual mistake of fact occurred, it would first
need to determine whether the parties were mistaken about the transaction’s
compliance with Sharia law at the time the sukuk transaction documents were
executed. In most instances, it would be fairly clear that the parties intended
to enter into a Sharia-compliant agreement158 as sukuk transaction documents
contain several references to Sharia compliance and fatwas obtained by the
originator confirming a belief that the transaction complies with Sharia
law.159
Even if a court were to find that these tenets of Sharia law and attendant
fatwas were improperly applied, it would then have to find that mistaken
reliance on these principles was material.160 To evaluate the materiality of a
mistaken fact, a court looks to whether the party would have been able to act
on the basis of the alleged mistaken fact.161 In Simkin v. Blank,162 for
example, the plaintiff sought reformation of a marital settlement agreement
on the basis of mutual mistake of fact.163 At the time the settlement
agreement was executed, the plaintiff’s assets included a brokerage account
worth approximately $5.4 million, which was managed by Bernie Madoff.164
The discovery of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme revealed that the account and its
assets were illegitimate.165 The plaintiff alleged that he and his ex-wife were
mutually mistaken as to the existence of a legitimate brokerage account and
that his true assets were less valuable than previously believed.166 On that
basis, he sought reformation of the assets awarded to his ex-wife in the
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Gould, 616 N.E.2d at 146.
157. Ryan v. Boucher, 534 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (App. Div. 1988).
158. But see Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 463 (noting that the contested agreement did not
indicate intent to transact on the basis of the alleged mistaken fact).
159. See, e.g., KSA SUKUK LTD., BASE PROSPECTUS cover page, i, 22, 226 (2017),
http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/Base%20Prospectus_7418c363-8ae7-4d0a-9c55-c5c6dcb
ee14f.PDF [https://perma.cc/U2XX-W6E8].
160. Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 463.
161. See id. at 464.
162. 968 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2012).
163. Id. at 460.
164. Id. at 461.
165. Id. For general information about Bernie Madoff’s $60 billion Ponzi scheme, see
Diana B. Henriques, Bernie Madoff’s Essential Man, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/magazine/bernie-madoffs-essential-man.html
[https://perma.cc/UCJ8-T5BY].
166. Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 461.
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divorce.167 The court held a mutual mistake regarding the existence of the
account would be found only if the parties would not have been able to act
upon the account—namely, whether the parties could have liquidated the
account prior to the discovery of the Ponzi scheme.168 Because the exhusband was, at one time, able to draw on the account, the court held that
there was no mistake of fact regarding the existence of the brokerage account
at the time of the agreement.169
If the Simkin holding was applied in a lawsuit alleging mutual mistake of
fact regarding a sukuk transaction’s alleged noncompliance with Sharia law,
the question would be whether the parties could have acted on the basis of
presumed compliance with Sharia law. Surely, the answer would be yes.
The very act of issuing sukuk certificates indicates that the parties are able to
act on the basis of believed Sharia compliance: obtaining assurances of
Sharia compliance, issuing and purchasing sukuk certificates, purchasing the
underlying assets, and distributing and receiving periodic payments.
Therefore, it is likely that, applying New York law, a court would not find
mutual mistake of fact and would not excuse performance, despite
subsequent reservations that the transaction does not comport with religious
law.
Further, a New York court will not apply the doctrine of mutual mistake
of fact where the party seeking rescission could have, in the exercise of
ordinary care, ascertained the truth of the fact prior to consummation of the
transaction.170 Before the issuance of any sukuk, the originator’s and issuer’s
Sharia supervisory boards confirm that the transaction complies with Sharia
law, which is documented in the prospectus.171 Investors are generally
encouraged to consult their own Sharia experts to determine compliance.172
If the parties to a transaction followed the industry norm for sukuk issuances
and reached their own conclusions regarding the compliance of the
transaction prior to executing the transaction documents, it is unlikely New

167. Id.
168. Id. at 464.
169. Id.
170. P.K. Dev., Inc. v. Elvem Dev. Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (App. Div. 1996).
171. See, e.g., KSA SUKUK LTD., supra note 159, at 226 (listing the Sharia supervisory
boards who approved the transaction structure). The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) requires an issuer conducting a registered offering to provide investors with a
prospectus, which contains information about the total number of certificates issued, the
offering price, fund objectives, investment strategies, risks, fund management, and fees and
expenses. See Information Available to Investment Company Shareholders, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmfinfo
htm.html#prospectus [https://perma.cc/66BG-7CKS] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). Although
certain exemptions may permit an issuer to conduct a private placement, such issuers generally
provide a private placement memorandum, which contains information similar to that
contained in a prospectus. Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under Regulation D,
INVESTOR.GOV (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/
alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-private-placements-under [https://perma.cc/U2C3-7D9Z].
172. See, e.g., KSA SUKUK LTD., supra note 159, at 226 (“Certificateholders . . . should
consult their own Shari’ah advisers as to whether the proposed transaction . . . is in
compliance with their individual standards of compliance with Shari’ah principles.”).
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York law would permit an equitable rescission of the contract based on a
theory that the parties were mistaken as to the fact of the transaction’s
compliance with Islamic law.173
Even assuming the mistaken-fact claim survived a motion to dismiss, the
Establishment Clause would definitively bar any further adjudication on the
religious question, leaving the issuer with a hollow victory.174 Although a
motion to dismiss accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, prevailing on
the merits of the religious question would require the fact finder to credit the
allegations of noncompliance after interpreting Islamic doctrine. Attempting
to do so triggers the Establishment Clause and renders the dispute
nonjusticiable. Thus, the current state of the law places plaintiffs alleging
religion-based claims between a rock and a hard place. The court will:
(1) dismiss the complaint as meritless; (2) dismiss the complaint as
nonjusticiable, thereby withholding a judicial remedy from the plaintiff; or
(3) minimize the religious question to the detriment of the parties.
III. PROPOSALS FOR LIMITED INTEGRATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
That courts will dismiss a commercial claim on grounds that it presents a
nonjusticiable religious question is deeply dissatisfying. Under the status
quo of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, courts will resolve property
disputes between religious parties because the state has a legitimate interest
in adjudicating such disputes where a civil court is the appropriate forum.175
Similarly, New York has a legitimate interest in resolving commercial
contract disputes, and a civil court is an appropriate forum for resolution of
contract disputes.176 New York’s interest is not diminished even though the
dispute touches religion. Further, unlike the ecclesiastical organizations
usually involved in religious property disputes, the parties to a sukuk
transaction are entities that are not part of a hierarchical body with
established doctrines and laws for dispute resolution. As the parties lack an
organized avenue for resolution, New York arguably has a greater interest in
resolving the dispute, yet the law currently offers no satisfactory relief to
these parties.
Though some have argued that the First Amendment should not be
incorporated against the states,177 the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to
173. In a way, this mirrors the English court’s rationale in determining that the risk of
noncompliance had been allocated to a specific party. The idea of allocating all the risk to
one party directly contradicts the Islamic risk-sharing model, in which all parties bear the loss.
See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
174. As a matter of public policy and resource allocation, it remains an open question
whether a court would undertake an extensive analysis of any claims on a motion to dismiss.
Whether the court grants or denies the motion, the result is dismissal of a complaint containing
a religious question.
175. See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in
the U.S., 464 N.E.2d 454, 458–60 (N.Y. 1984).
176. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 127; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment should not be incorporated against
the states); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–51 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
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reverse decades of state-related Establishment Clause precedent.178 The
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is firmly entrenched in federal and
state court decisions and the fundamental societal norm of separation of
church and state.179 Since the Court’s position on judicial adjudication of
religious disputes is unlikely to change, this Note proposes alternatives for
parties to an Islamic finance agreement who seek judicial remedies under
New York law. Part III.A proposes a legislative remedy applicable in both
state and federal courts, while Part III.B highlights court-sanctioned
extrajudicial alternatives currently available to contracting parties who wish
to execute agreements that may present nonjusticiable religious questions.
A. Certification of Religious Questions
Like most states, New York has a procedure for the certification of
questions of state law to the state’s highest court.180 The New York Court of
Appeals will consider questions certified by federal circuit courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court, or the highest court of another state and will resolve issues
of law that are outcome determinative and for which no controlling precedent
exists.181 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit generates the
concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Permitting state courts to adjudicate religious disputes would arguably further New York’s
interest in resolving contract disputes that arise under New York law, provide a judicial forum
for resolution of all contract disputes, and further New York’s interest in being the preferred
choice of law in commercial agreements. See supra notes 11, 112–15 and accompanying text.
However, the practical implications of researching religious doctrine and packaging its
intricacies into understandable expert witness testimony or jury instructions, tasking a fact
finder with applying those instructions, and the effects of stare decisis weigh heavily against
permitting a secular court to interpret religious doctrine. Further, concerns about the timeline
and cost of litigation caution against secular adjudication of religious disputes. See Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 31–32 (Del. 2005) (noting
that a court tasked with determining the elements of a Saudi cause of action undertook months
of Islamic studies, hired its own expert witness who traveled to Saudi Arabia for further
research, and read over 1000 pages of expert witness deposition testimony and nine expert
reports before issuing its ruling); Andrew White, Dispute Resolution and Specialized ADR for
Islamic Finance, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 306, 314 (noting
that even basic, fundamental principles of Islamic law are elusive to Western legal scholars
who lack expertise).
178. The incorporation of the First Amendment against the states was articulated as early
as 1940. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Even if the Establishment
Clause was not incorporated against the states, New York law bars the adjudication of
religious disputes. See S. S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass’n of Greater N.Y., 285
N.Y.S. 879, 890 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (holding that New York courts would not “assume to dictate
or to interpret ecclesiastical doctrine” (quoting Harlem Church of Seventh Day Adventists v.
Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 260 N.Y.S. 517, 522 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev’d
on other grounds, 280 N.Y.S. 828 (App. Div. 1935), modified, 198 N.E. 615 (N.Y. 1935) (per
curiam))).
179. See Green, supra note 8, at 443.
180. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(9); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.27(a)
(2018).
181. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(9). The Court of Appeals may also consider certified
questions submitted indirectly by federal district courts through 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which
allows district courts to certify issues of state law to federal appellate courts, which may then
certify the question to the N.Y. Court of Appeals. ADVISORY GRP. TO THE N.Y. STATE & FED.
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majority of the certification requests for the New York Court of Appeals and
has a mechanism in place that allows certification upon either the request of
a party or sua sponte.182 Regardless of whether a party’s certification request
is accepted or rejected, there is no formal procedure for a party to appeal the
decision, although it may submit letters supporting or opposing
certification.183
Similar legislation and procedures could be enacted to permit the
certification of religious questions to a religious tribunal.184 A tribunal
would then render an opinion on the religious question, which would decide
the matter for the secular court without requiring the judiciary to delve into
doctrinal matters. Since a court could not designate a religious tribunal on
its own, the parties would need to agree to certify the religious questions to a
tribunal.185 The parties could include a provision in the transaction
agreements designating a tribunal and its members or a process for choosing
a tribunal and its members. A provision that designates a tribunal would not
be substantially different than an arbitration provision that designates an
organization from which an arbitration panel may be chosen, such as the
American Arbitration Association. As this would be a secular provision of
the agreement, a court need not be troubled by entanglement concerns.186
Alternatively, a tribunal could be chosen during the pretrial casemanagement process. Many courts require parties to mediate before

JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PRACTICE HANDBOOK ON CERTIFICATION OF STATE LAW QUESTIONS BY THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT TO THE NEW YORK STATE COURT
OF APPEALS 6 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ADVISORY GRP.], https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/
forms/certhandbk.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7BU-B245] .
182. See id. at 2.
183. Id. at 10.
184. This Note acknowledges the difficulties that may be associated with enacting this
proposed legislative remedy particularly at the federal level, given recent anti-Sharia
sentiments in state legislatures. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2018) (“No court . . . may
enforce any provisions of any religious code.”); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th
Cir. 2012) (affirming a district court order granting a preliminary injunction to prevent
certification of the results of a voter-approved constitutional amendment that would prevent
Oklahoma courts from applying international or Sharia law); H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (proposed legislation prohibiting the judicial application of foreign law or
ratification of any private agreement based on foreign or religious law, including Sharia law,
canon law, Halacha, and karma); see also State Legislation Restricting Judicial Consideration
of Foreign or Religious Law, 2010–2012, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/State-legislationrestricting-foreign-or-religious-law1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LDE-BHYF] (noting that
between 2010 and 2012, thirty-two states introduced ninety-two bills restricting judicial
consideration of religious law). New York has not introduced similar anti-religiousdetermination legislation. However, proposed legislation that would create a sukuk investment
vehicle known as an alternative finance instrument bond has died in committee each session.
See, e.g., S.B. 3637, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
185. Court-designated religious tribunals would likely pose the same Establishment Clause
issues as judicial interpretations of religious law and promote the beliefs of one religious
tribunal over another. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
186. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138–39 (N.Y. 1983) (finding that neither law nor
public policy prevented the court from enforcing the secular terms of a religious agreement).
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continuing the litigation.187 In the same way that a mediator is not selected
until the case is referred to mediation, a tribunal need not be designated until
the court certifies a religious question.188
Just as the New York Court of Appeals retains jurisdiction over whether
to accept or reject a certification request, a religious tribunal would retain the
right to reject a court’s request.189 Under such circumstances, a court may
permit the parties to select a different tribunal that would accept the
certification request, or a court may dismiss the case as nonjusticiable
because denial of the certification request leaves a court with no path to
adjudication without violating the Establishment Clause.190
Like any extrajudicial adjudicatory process, certification requests present
some concerns.191 First, there is no guarantee that a religious tribunal would
be willing to accept a certification request from a secular court. Such
organizations may prefer that parties present disputes directly to the tribunal
for full adjudication, not merely the certified question. Certainly, if religious
tribunals abstain from certifying requests, devout parties would have no
choice but to appear before such tribunals for adjudication of their disputes
because resolution would otherwise be unavailable.192 While this furthers
the parties’ interest in having matters adjudicated according to their religious
beliefs, it undermines a state’s interest in resolving disputes that arise within
its borders, under its laws, and involving its citizens.193 Particularly as
applicable to Islamic finance, this outcome would undermine New York’s
interest in adjudicating commercial disputes, as devout parties would have
no incentive to include New York in choice-of-law or forum-selection
provisions.194 This would weaken New York’s position as a commercial
center in the financial industry, even as the Islamic finance industry continues
to grow.

187. See S.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. § 83.9(d) (requiring parties to eligible cases to consider
mediation and report to the court the perceived usefulness of mediation to resolve the dispute);
N.Y. COMMERCIAL DIV. N.Y. CTY. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. 3 (stating that the
presiding justice refers a case for mediation by order of reference); Administrative Order (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ComDiv/NY/PDFs/AO-Mand
Medshort42017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG26-P4YP] (ordering mandatory mediation for all
commercial disputes filed outside the Commercial Division).
188. See Procedures of the Mediation Program, U.S. DISTRICT CT. S. DISTRICT N.Y.
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/mediation/Mediation%20Program%20
Procedures.12.9.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4PE-L5L5].
189. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 22, § 500.27(d) (2018) (implying that the
acceptance of certified questions is a discretionary decision by the New York Court of
Appeals).
190. See supra Part II.
191. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of problems inherent in ADR.
192. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of extrajudicial resolutions.
193. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (listing the public
interests in a diversity case, which include local interest in deciding localized controversies at
home, conducting a trial in a forum at home with the law governing the dispute, and ensuring
jurors have an interest in the case when completing jury duty).
194. See supra notes 11, 112–15 and accompanying text.
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Second, certification lengthens the timeline of litigation.195 A court has
an administrative interest in clearing its docket. Certification removes some
of a court’s power to quickly resolve disputes.196 A religious tribunal may
be slow to accept or reject certification or render an opinion, which would
effectively give the tribunal power to stay secular court proceedings by
preventing a case from moving forward on the merits.197 However, this
scenario is unlikely because religious tribunals have a vested interest in
rendering speedy opinions. Moreover, as the tribunals would be selected by
the parties rather than appointed by the court, economic competition would
motivate the tribunals to establish a reputation for issuing fair and timely
opinions.
Third, the scope of the questions posed for certification, and the attendant
answers, varies widely. The New York Court of Appeals may answer the
certified question as framed by the requesting court or may rewrite the
question to consider relevant state law issues.198 If religious tribunals
followed that example, the opinion rendered may be broader than the
question posed and may encroach on a court’s adjudication of the secular
issues in the case. This potential problem can be remedied by including
language in enacting legislation that limits the scope of the opinion to the
certified question. Further, a court need not apply an overly broad opinion
just as a court need not follow dicta.
B. Alternatives Currently Available Under New York Law
While a legislative remedy may be ideal, it is currently unavailable for
transacting parties. The legislative process can be long and tedious, which
means any legislative relief is unlikely to come quickly enough for parties
currently grappling with these concerns. As parties must make do with what
is available, this Note highlights two viable options for contracting around
the Establishment Clause: stipulation of Sharia compliance and ADR—
specifically arbitration.
1. Stipulation of Sharia Compliance
One of the most effective ways to preempt a mutual-mistake claim is to
warrant the existence of a fact or circumstance.199 Before any sukuk
issuance, the originator and issuer obtain a fatwa from their Sharia

195. For reference, the Court of Appeals generally renders a decision to accept or reject a
certification request within twenty-seven days, but the average time for the court to render an
opinion on the certified question is about seven months. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 181, at
10.
196. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (recognizing that congested dockets present
administrative problems for a court).
197. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 181, at 3.
198. See Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 222 F.3d 63, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2000)
(clarifying that the New York Court of Appeals was not limited to answering only the certified
question).
199. See Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd., [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [63].
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supervisory board declaring the sukuk Sharia compliant.200 Currently,
warranties of compliance are disclaimed by the issuer, and investors are
instructed to consult their own experts to determine the transaction’s
compliance with Sharia law.201 To share the risk of a mistake, the parties
could stipulate and mutually warrant that the transaction accords with Sharia
law. By entering the transaction, the parties would agree that they believe
the transaction is Sharia compliant at the time of execution or that they are
waiving any concerns about Sharia compliance. If the parties memorialized
that understanding in a binding stipulation, performance would be required
even if market practices shift and render the transaction noncompliant with
the revised standards. Thus, transaction disputes would not require a court
to delve into religious doctrine because the stipulation would have the effect
of barring a party’s claim of avoidance due to noncompliance. This solution
would eliminate a court’s Establishment Clause problem and enable the court
to adjudicate the parties’ contract claims.
Despite the fact that this solution removes excessive entanglement for the
judiciary, is unlikely to be a satisfying resolution for parties who truly care
about Sharia compliance. Parties bargain for a Sharia-compliant financial
product and, in the process, incur additional transaction costs and forgo
financial benefits available in Western financing because of the importance
of Islam in their personal lives. If evolving standards render a transaction
noncompliant, it is unlikely that an observant Muslim would want to be
bound to continued performance of contract obligations that knowingly
violate Sharia law.202 A stipulation of compliance would arguably clash with
ijtihad, which requires a de novo review of all issues, because the stipulation
removes all further inquiry.203 By creating a prior agreement that the
transaction will be deemed compliant, the parties prevent the requisite
determination, pursuant to Islamic law, that the transaction is, in fact,
compliant. This path could create a transaction that is merely facially Sharia
compliant. Although stipulation is a viable alternative, it does not present an
ideal solution.
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution
As in cases involving Jewish law, the parties could submit their dispute to
the authority of an extrajudicial forum for resolution.204 To do so, the
transaction agreements would need to include a provision mandating that
religious questions be decided through an agreed-upon form of ADR. To the
extent that parties seek judicial resolution of religious questions, a court
200. See supra notes 159, 171–72 and accompanying text.
201. KSA SUKUK LTD., supra note 159, at 226.
202. In a situation where there is bilateral agreement about noncompliance, the parties
could agree to release each other from continued obligations or restructure the transaction to
align with revised standards, but that is not addressed in this Note.
203. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 18.
204. See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138–39 (N.Y. 1983) (enforcing parties’
prenuptial agreement to appear before a religious tribunal); Helfand, supra note 1, at 1247–49
(discussing trends in Jewish arbitration).
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could enforce an extrajudicial forum’s resolution of the religious question.205
Contracting around the Establishment Clause in this manner would best serve
the parties’ needs and protect the judiciary’s integrity. Most importantly for
New York, this approach frees courts of a potential excessive religious
entanglement.206 Courts would be called upon to adjudicate secular
provisions of an agreement in accordance with secular law, not religious
questions.207 Further, courts could enforce a tribunal’s determination as a
secular provision of the parties’ original agreement, subject to public
policy.208
An extrajudicial forum would best serve the needs of the parties to conduct
their commercial transactions in accordance with Sharia law.209 By
preselecting a tribunal or arbiter, the parties could choose an adjudicatory
authority known to adhere to a particular set of religious beliefs. Given the
variance within Islamic scholarship across schools of thought, the parties
could agree to have matters decided by a tribunal comprised of scholars that
best reflect the parties’ beliefs.210 The parties could choose to have the matter
decided by certain prominent Islamic scholars or their local imams.211 If
desired, the parties could agree to have the religious tribunal decide all
matters of breach and awards to ensure that all components of the dispute
resolution process adhere to Sharia law.212
205. See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138–39 (finding that neither law nor public policy
prevented the court from enforcing the secular terms of the religious agreement requiring the
husband to appear before a religious tribunal).
206. Helfand, supra note 1, at 1244–45.
207. See Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 354 (D.C. 2005) (holding
that an order to compel arbitration before a rabbinical tribunal did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the determination did not require the court to even address the
parties’ underlying religious dispute); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 408, 413 (Tex. 2003)
(holding valid and enforceable an agreement to appear before a three-imam arbitral panel of
the Texas Islamic Court).
208. See Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2007) (enforcing arbitral
determinations of a Jewish rabbinical tribunal pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act); Elmora
Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 731 (N.J. 1991) (noting that one party was bound
by the rabbinical arbitral determination so long as the party agreed to submit the issue to the
tribunal); Berg v. Berg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (App. Div. 2011) (upholding a rabbinical
arbitration award where the plaintiff failed to prove prejudicial impropriety or misconduct or
duress); Helfand, supra note 1, at 1260 (“U.S. courts cannot enforce arbitration awards that
violate public policy.”).
209. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34 (1991) (holding that the
purpose of arbitration is to give effect to the intent of the parties); Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138–
39 (noting that the religious question was appropriately left to the extrajudicial forum chosen
by the parties).
210. Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial
Review, and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 179–80 (2007) (describing Canadian
Islamic arbitral proceedings in which parties choose which school of Islamic jurisprudence
will govern the proceedings).
211. See Zeiler, 500 F.3d at 157 (accepting, without review, the parties’ selection of rabbis
for an arbitral tribunal).
212. Helfand, supra note 1, at 1249–50 (detailing distinctions in Islamic law regarding
evidentiary standards and discovery). Sharia law limits the amount of damages awarded to a
party. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 35–36 (Del.
2005).
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It is possible that allowing a religious tribunal to decide the entire dispute
would jeopardize the correct application of New York law because the
tribunal may have differing interests from secular law.213 Further, courts are
highly deferential toward arbitral awards and will modify or vacate awards
only on narrow grounds.214 These problems are, however, not unique to
religious arbitration and are present in any arbitral proceeding, and there
remains a strong push for arbitration in secular disputes nevertheless.215
Importantly, New York courts will not enforce arbitration decisions that
contravene public policy. Consequently, there are safeguards in place to
ensure that arbitral decisions do not greatly disadvantage the parties.216 And
even if the tribunal only decided matters of Sharia compliance, the parties
would benefit from a forum that renders decisions consistent with Sharia law,
which makes this solution the most feasible—and beneficial—option
currently available.217
CONCLUSION
New York law has a strong interest in adjudicating disputes appropriate
for resolution in a judicial forum, including Islamic commercial disputes.
The Establishment Clause, however, presents an impenetrable bar to the
adjudication of matters that require a court to determine religious doctrine.
Such rulings would result in courts preferencing one religious interpretation
over another and would create an excessive religious entanglement that
violates the First Amendment. Absent legislative intervention that would
permit a court to certify religious questions to a tribunal, the parties to an
Islamic commercial agreement should consider contracting around the
Establishment Clause by stipulating to a transaction’s compliance or directly
submitting to the jurisdiction of an extrajudicial forum capable of deciding
religious disputes in a manner consistent with the parties’ beliefs. The
resulting extrajudicial determination would generally be enforceable by a
secular court, which could still hear claims relating to the secular provisions
of the agreement. Failure to contract around the Establishment Clause
exposes the parties to the risk of being denied a remedy for breach of contract,
213. See Helfand, supra note 1, at 1260–68 (discussing the restricted rules of procedure
common in religious arbitration).
214. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012) (permitting vacatur of arbitral award in only four
circumstances); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511 (2018) (stating the limited grounds for modification or
vacatur of award).
215. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (“[T]he Federal
Arbitration Act . . . embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”).
216. See Helfand, supra note 1, at 1254–60 (outlining the rationale and examples of public
policy vacaturs of arbitral awards).
217. While Islamic arbitral tribunals are generally unestablished in the United States, there
has been a recent movement to establish Islamic arbitration courts. Helfand, supra note 1, at
1249–50 (noting the creation of the Fiqh Council of North America and the Council of Masajid
of the United States); see also Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 407–08, 413 (Tex. 2003)
(holding an arbitral agreement to appear before a three-imam panel of the Texas Islamic Court
valid and enforceable).
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whether declaratory, injunctive, or monetary, or granted a remedy that does
not address the heart of the dispute, which would ultimately hinder the
growth of the Islamic finance industry in the United States.

